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Abstract
We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria (α-PNE) in weighted atomic
congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d. Previously it was
known that d-approximate equilibria always exist, while nonexistence was established only
for small constants, namely for 1.153-PNE. We improve significantly upon this gap, proving
that such games in general do not have Θ˜(
√
d)-approximate PNE, which provides the first
super-constant lower bound.
Furthermore, we provide a black-box gap-introducing method of combining such nonexis-
tence results with a specific circuit gadget, in order to derive NP-completeness of the decision
version of the problem. In particular, deploying this technique we are able to show that
deciding whether a weighted congestion game has an O˜(
√
d)-PNE is NP-complete. Previous
hardness results were known only for the special case of exact equilibria and arbitrary cost
functions.
The circuit gadget is of independent interest and it allows us to also prove hardness for a
variety of problems related to the complexity of PNE in congestion games. For example, we
demonstrate that the question of existence of α-PNE in which a certain set of players plays
a specific strategy profile is NP-hard for any α < 3d/2, even for unweighted congestion games.
Finally, we study the existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games
with general (nondecreasing) costs, as a function of the number of players n. We show that
n-PNE always exist, matched by an almost tight nonexistence bound of Θ˜(n) which we can
again transform into an NP-completeness proof for the decision problem.
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1 Introduction
Congestion games constitute the standard framework to study settings where selfish players
compete over common resources. They are one of the most well-studied classes of games within
the field of algorithmic game theory [25, 31], covering a wide range of applications, including,
e.g., traffic routing and load balancing. In their most general form, each player has her own
weight and the latency on each resource is a nondecreasing function of the total weight of players
that occupy it. The cost of a player on a given outcome is just the total latency that she is
experiencing, summed over all the resources she is using.
The canonical approach to analysing such systems and predicting the behaviour of the
participants is the ubiquitous game-theoretic tool of equilibrium analysis. More specifically, we
are interested in the pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of those games; these are stable configurations
from which no player would benefit from unilaterally deviating. However, it is a well-known fact
that such desirable outcomes might not always exist, even in very simple weighted congestion
games. A natural response, especially from a computer science perspective, is to relax the
solution notion itself by considering approximate pure Nash equilibria (α-PNE); these are states
from which, even if a player could improve her cost by deviating, this improvement could not be
by more than a (multiplicative) factor of α ≥ 1. Allowing the parameter α to grow sufficiently
large, existence of α-PNE is restored. But how large does α really need to be? And, perhaps
more importantly from a computational perspective, how hard is it to check whether a specific
game has indeed an α-PNE?
1.1 Related Work
The origins of the systematic study of (atomic) congestion games can be traced back to the
influential work of Rosenthal [29, 30]. Although Rosenthal showed the existence of congestion
games without PNE, he also proved that unweighted congestion games always possess such
equilibria. His proof is based on a simple but ingenious potential function argument, which up
to this day is essentially still the only general tool for establishing existence of pure equilibria.
In follow-up work [14, 17, 24], the nonexistence of PNE was demonstrated even for special
simple classes of (weighted) games, including network congestion games with quadratic cost
functions and games where the player weights are either 1 or 2. On the other hand, we know
that equilibria do exist for affine or exponential latencies [14, 19, 27], as well as for the class of
singleton1 games [15, 20]. Dunkel and Schulz [11] were able to extend the nonexistence instance
of Fotakis et al. [14] to a gadget in order to show that deciding whether a congestion game
with step cost functions has a PNE is a (strongly) NP-hard problem, via a reduction from
3-Partition.
Regarding approximate equilibria, Hansknecht et al. [18] gave instances of very simple,
two-player polynomial congestion games that do not have α-PNE, for α ≈ 1.153. This lower
bound is achieved by numerically solving an optimization program, using polynomial latencies of
maximum degree d = 4. On the positive side, Caragiannis et al. [4] proved that d!-PNE always
exist; this upper bound on the existence of α-PNE was later improved to α = d+ 1 [9, 18] and
α = d [3].
1.2 Our Results and Techniques
After formalizing our model in Section 2, in Section 3 we show the nonexistence of Θ˜(
√
d)-
approximate equilibria for polynomial congestion games of degree d. This is the first super-
constant lower bound on the nonexistence of α-PNE, significantly improving upon the previous
constant of α ≈ 1.153 and reducing the gap with the currently best upper bound of d. More
specifically (Theorem 1), for any integer d we construct congestion games with polynomial cost
1These are congestion games where the players can only occupy single resources.
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functions of maximum degree d (and nonnegative coefficients) that do not have α-PNE, for any
α < α(d) where α(d) is a function that grows as α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. To derive this bound, we had
to use a novel construction with a number of players growing unboundedly as a function of d.
Next, in Section 4 we turn our attention to computational hardness constructions. Starting
from a Boolean circuit, we create a gadget that transfers hard instances of the classic Circuit
Satisfiability problem to (even unweighted) polynomial congestion games. Using this gadget
we can immediately establish computational hardness for various computational questions of
interest involving congestion games (Theorem 2). For example, we show that deciding whether
a d-degree polynomial congestion game has an α-PNE in which a specific set of players play
a specific strategy profile is NP-hard, even up to exponentially-approximate equilibria; more
specifically, the hardness holds for any α < 3d/2. It is of interest to note here that our hardness
gadget is gap-introducing, in the sense that the α-PNE and exact PNE of the game coincide.
In Section 5 we demonstrate how one can combine the hardness gadget of Section 4, in
a black-box way, with any nonexistence instance for α-PNE, in order to derive hardness for
the decision version of the existence of α-PNE (Lemma 2, Theorem 3). As a consequence,
using the previous Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
lower bound construction of Section 3, we can show that deciding
whether a (weighted) polynomial congestion has an α-PNE is NP-hard, for any α < α(d), where
α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
(Corollary 1). Since our hardness is established via a rather transparent, “master”
reduction from Circuit Satisfiability, which in particular is parsimonious, one can derive
hardness for a family of related computation problems; for example, we show that computing
the number of α-approximate equilibria of a weighted polynomial congestion game is #P-hard
(Corollary 2).
In Section 6 we drop the assumption on polynomial cost functions, and study the existence
of approximate equilibria under arbitrary (nondecreasing) latencies as a function of the number
of players n. We prove that n-player congestion games always have n-approximate PNE
(Theorem 4). As a consequence, one cannot hope to derive super-constant nonexistence lower
bounds by using just simple instances with a fixed number of players. In particular, this
shows that the super-constant number of players in our construction in Theorem 1 is necessary.
Furthermore, we pair this positive result with an almost matching lower bound (Theorem 5):
we give examples of n-player congestion games (where latencies are simple step functions with
a single breakpoint) that do not have α-PNE for all α < α(n), where α(n) grows according to
α(n) = Ω
(
n
lnn
)
. Finally, inspired by our hardness construction for the polynomial case, we also
give a new reduction that establishes NP-hardness for deciding whether an α-PNE exists, for
any α < α(n) = Ω
(
n
lnn
)
. Notice that now the number of players n is part of the description
of the game (i.e., part of the input) as opposed to the maximum degree d for the polynomial
case (which was assumed to be fixed). On the other hand though, we have more flexibility on
designing our gadget latencies, since they can be arbitrary functions.
Concluding, we would like to elaborate on a couple of points. First, the reader would have
already noticed that in all our hardness results the (in)approximability parameter α ranges
freely within an entire interval of the form [1, α˜), where α˜ is a function of the degree d (for
polynomial congestion games) or of the number of players n; and that α, α˜ are not part of the
problem’s input. It is easy to see that these features only make our results stronger, with respect
to computational hardness, but also more robust. Secondly, although in this introductory section
all our hardness results were presented in terms of NP-hardness, they immediately translate to
NP-completeness under standard assumptions on the parameter α; e.g., if α is rational (for a
more detailed discussion of this, see also the end of Section 2).
2
2 Model and Notation
A (weighted, atomic) congestion game is defined by: a finite (nonempty) set of resources E,
each e ∈ E having a nondecreasing cost (or latency) function ce : R>0 −→ R≥0; and a finite
(nonempty) set of players N , |N | = n, each i ∈ N having a weight wi > 0 and a set of strategies
Si ⊆ 2E . If all players have the same weight, wi = 1 for all i ∈ N , the game is called unweighted.
A polynomial congestion game of degree d, for d a nonnegative integer, is a congestion game such
that all its cost functions are polynomials of degree at most d with nonnegative coefficients. A
strategy profile (or outcome) s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is a collection of strategies, one for each player,
i.e. s ∈ S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn. Each strategy profile s induces a cost of Ci(s) = ∑e∈si ce(xe(s))
to every player i ∈ N , where xe(s) = ∑i:e∈si wi is the induced load on resource e. An outcome s
will be called α-approximate (pure Nash) equilibrium (α-PNE), where α ≥ 1, if no player can
unilaterally improve her cost by more than a factor of α. Formally:
Ci(s) ≤ α · Ci
(
s′i, s−i
)
for all i ∈ N and all s′i ∈ Si. (1)
Here we have used the standard game-theoretic notation of s−i to denote the vector of strategies
resulting from s if we remove its i-th coordinate; in that way, one can write s = (si, s−i). Notice
that for the special case of α = 1, (1) is equivalent to the classical definition of pure Nash
equilibria; for emphasis, we will sometimes refer to such 1-PNE as exact equilibria.
If (1) does not hold, it means that player i could improve her cost by more than α by moving
from si to some other strategy s′i. We call such a move α-improving. Finally, strategy si is said
to be α-dominating for player i (with respect to a fixed profile s−i) if
Ci
(
s′i, s−i
)
> α · Ci(s) for all s′i 6= si. (2)
In other words, if a strategy si is α-dominating, every move from some other strategy s′i to
si is α-improving. Notice that each player i can have at most one α-dominating strategy (for
s−i fixed). In our proofs, we will employ a gap-introducing technique by constructing games
with the property that, for any player i and any strategy profile s−i, there is always a (unique)
α-dominating strategy for player i. As a consequence, the sets of α-PNE and exact PNE coincide.
Finally, for a positive integer n, we will use Φn to denote the unique positive solution of
equation (x+ 1)n = xn+1. Then, Φn is strictly increasing with respect to n, with Φ1 = φ ≈ 1.618
(golden ratio) and asymptotically Φn ∼ nlnn (see [9, Lemma A.3]).
Computational Complexity Most of the results in this paper involve complexity questions,
regarding the existence of (approximate) equilibria. Whenever we deal with such statements, we
will implicitly assume that the congestion game instances given as inputs to our problems can
be succinctly represented in the following way:
• all player have rational weights;
• the resource cost functions are “efficiently computable”; for polynomial latencies in partic-
ular, we will assume that the coefficients are rationals; and for step functions we assume
that their values and breakpoints are rationals;
• the strategy sets are given explicitly.2
There are also computational considerations to be made about the number α appearing in
the definition of α-PNE. In our results (e.g., Theorems 2 and 3), we will prove NP-hardness of
determining whether games have α-PNE for any arbitrary real α below the nonexistence bound,
2Alternatively, we could have simply assumed succinct representability of the strategies. A prominent such
case is that of network congestion games, where each player’s strategies are all feasible paths between two specific
nodes of an underlying graph. Notice however that, since in this paper we are proving hardness results, insisting
on explicit representation only makes our results even stronger.
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a0 a1 · · · ai · · · an
bn · · · bi · · · b1 b0
Figure 1: Strategies of the game Gd(n,k,w,β). Resources contained in the two ellipses of the same colour correspond
to the two strategies of a player. The strategies of the heavy player and light players n and i are depicted in black,
grey and light grey, respectively.
regardless of whether α is rational or irrational, computable or uncomputable. However, to prove
NP-completeness, i.e. to prove that the decision problem belongs in NP (as in Theorem 3), we
need to be able to verify, given a strategy profile and a deviation of some player, whether this
deviation is an α-improving move. This can be achieved by additionally assuming that the upper
Dedekind cut of α, Rα = {q ∈ Q | q > α}, is a language decidable in polynomial time. In this
paper we will refer to such an α as a polynomial-time computable real number. In particular,
notice that rationals are polynomial-time computable; thus the NP-completeness of the α-PNE
problem does hold for α rational. We refer the interested reader to Ko [22] for a detailed
discussion on polynomial-time computable numbers (which is beyond the scope of our paper),
as well as for a comparison with other axiomatizations using binary digits representations or
convergent sequences. If, more generally, α : N −→ R is a sequence of reals (as in Theorem 6),
we say that α is a polynomial-time computable real sequence if Rα = {(n, q) ∈ N×Q | q > α(n)}
is a language decidable in polynomial time.
3 The Nonexistence Gadget
In this section we give examples of polynomial congestion games of degree d, that do not have
α(d)-approximate equilibria; α(d) grows as Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. Fixing a degree d ≥ 2, we construct a
family of games Gd(n,k,w,β), specified by parameters n ∈ N, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w ∈ [0, 1], and β ∈ [0, 1].
In Gd(n,k,w,β) there are n + 1 players: a heavy player of weight 1 and n light players 1, . . . , n
of equal weights w. There are 2(n + 1) resources a0, a1, . . . , an, b0, b1, . . . , bn where a0 and b0
have the same cost function c0 and all other resources a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn have the same cost
function c1 given by
c0(x) = xk and c1(x) = βxd.
Each player has exactly two strategies, and the strategy sets are given by
S0 = {{a0, . . . , an}, {b0, . . . , bn}} and Si = {{a0, bi}, {b0, ai}} for i = 1, . . . , n.
The structure of the strategies is visualized in Figure 1.
In the following theorem we give a lower bound on α, depending on parameters (n, k, w, β),
such that games Gd(n,k,w,β) do not admit an α-PNE. Maximizing this lower bound over all games
in the family, we obtain a general lower bound α(d) on the inapproximability for polynomial
congestion games of degree d (see (3) and its plot in Fig. 2). Finally, choosing specific values for
the parameters (n, k, w, β), we prove that α(d) is asymptotically lower bounded by Ω(
√
d
ln d).
Theorem 1. For any integer d ≥ 2, there exist (weighted) polynomial congestion games of
degree d that do not have α-approximate PNE for any α < α(d), where
α(d) = sup
n,k,w,β
min
{
1 + nβ(1 + w)d
(1 + nw)k + nβ ,
(1 + w)k + βwd
(nw)k + β(1 + w)d
}
(3)
s.t. n ∈ N, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 2: Nonexistence of α(d)-PNE for weighted polynomial congestion games of degree d, as given by (3)
in Theorem 1, for d = 2, 3, . . . , 100.
In particular, we have the asymptotics α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
and the bound α(d) ≥
√
d
2 ln d , valid for
large enough d. A plot of the exact values of α(d) (given by (3)) for small degrees can be found
in Figure 2.
Proof. Due to symmetries, it is enough to just consider the following two cases for the strategy
profiles in game Gd(n,k,w,β) described above:
Case 1: The heavy player is alone on resource a0. This means that every light player
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} must have chosen strategy {b0, ai}. Thus the heavy player incurs a cost of c0(1) +
nc1(1+w); while, deviating to strategy {b0, . . . , bn}, she would incur a cost of c0(1+nw)+nc1(1).
The improvement factor can then be lower bounded by
c0(1) + nc1(1 + w)
c0(1 + nw) + nc1(1)
= 1 + nβ(1 + w)
d
(1 + nw)k + nβ .
Case 2: The heavy player shares resource a0 with at least one light player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Thus player i incurs a cost of at least c0(1 +w) + c1(w); while, deviating to strategy {b0, ai}, she
would incur a cost of at most c0(nw) + c1(1 + w). The improvement factor can then be lower
bounded by
c0(1 + w) + c1(w)
c0(nw) + c1(1 + w)
= (1 + w)
k + βwd
(nw)k + β(1 + w)d .
In order for the game to not have an α-PNE, it is enough to guarantee that both ratios are
greater than α. Maximizing these ratios over all games in the family, yields the lower bound in
the statement of the theorem,
α(d) = sup
n,k,w,β
min
{
1 + nβ(1 + w)d
(1 + nw)k + nβ ,
(1 + w)k + βwd
(nw)k + β(1 + w)d
}
s.t. n ∈ N, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ [0, 1].
For small values of d the above quantity can be computed numerically (see Fig. 2); in
particular, for d = 2, 3, 4 this yields the same lower bounds as in Hansknecht et al. [18], since
n = 1 is the optimal choice.
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Next we prove the asymptotics α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. To that end, we take the following choice of
parameters:
w = ln d2d , k =
⌈ ln d
2 ln ln d
⌉
, β = 1
d
k
2(k+1) (1 + w)d
, n =
⌊
1
d
1
2(k+1)w
⌋
.
One can check that this choice satisfies k ∈ {1, . . . , d} (for d ≥ 4) and w, β ∈ [0, 1]. We can
bound the expressions appearing in (3) as follows.
1 + nβ(1 + w)d ≥ 1 +
(
1
d
1
2(k+1)w
− 1
)
1
d
k
2(k+1) (1 + w)d
(1 + w)d
= 1 +
(
2d
d
1
2(k+1) ln d
− 1
)
1
d
k
2(k+1)
= 2d
d
1
2(k+1)+
k
2(k+1) ln d
+ 1− 1
d
k
2(k+1)
≥ 2d
d1/2 ln d
(since d ≥ 1)
= 2
√
d
ln d ; (4)
(1 + nw)k + nβ ≤
(
1 + 1
d
1
2(k+1)w
w
)k
+ 1
d
1
2(k+1)wd
k
2(k+1) (1 + w)d
=
(
1 + d−
1
2(k+1)
)k
+ 1
d1/2 ln d2d
(
1 + ln d2d
)d
=
(
1 + d−
1
2(k+1)
)k
+ 2
√
d
ln d
(
1 + ln d2d
)d ; (5)
(1 + w)k + βwd ≥ 1; (6)
(nw)k + β(1 + w)d ≤
(
1
d
1
2(k+1)w
w
)k
+ 1
d
k
2(k+1) (1 + w)d
(1 + w)d
= 2 · 1
d
k
2(k+1)
= 2d
1
2(k+1)
√
d
≤ 2d
ln ln d
ln d√
d
= 2 ln d√
d
. (7)
In the Appendix, we prove (Lemma 3) that the final quantity in (5) converges to 1 as d→∞;
in particular, it is upper bounded by 4 for d large enough. Thus, we can lower bound the ratios
of (3) as
1 + nβ(1 + w)d
(1 + nw)k + nβ ≥
2
√
d
ln d
4 =
√
d
2 ln d = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
, (from (4), (5) and large d)
(1 + w)k + βwd
(nw)k + β(1 + w)d ≥
1
2 ln d√
d
=
√
d
2 ln d = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. (from (6) and (7))
This proves the asymptotics and the bound α(d) ≥
√
d
2 ln d for large d.
4 The Hardness Gadget
In this section we construct an unweighted polynomial congestion game from a Boolean circuit.
In the α-PNE of this game the players emulate the computation of the circuit. This gadget will
6
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(a) valid circuit C
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g3 g2
g1
(c) directed acyclic graph
Figure 3: Example of a valid circuit C (having both NOT and NAND gates), its canonical form (having only
NAND gates), and the directed acyclic graph corresponding to C.
be used in reductions from Circuit Satisfiability to show NP-hardness of several problems
related to the existence of approximate equilibria with some additional properties. For example,
deciding whether a congestion game has an α-PNE where a certain set of players choose a
specific strategy profile (Theorem 2).
Circuit Model We consider Boolean circuits consisting of NOT gates and 2-input NAND
gates only. We assume that the two inputs to every NAND gate are different. Otherwise we
replace the NAND gate by a NOT gate, without changing the semantics of the circuit. We
further assume that every input bit is connected to exactly one gate and this gate is a NOT gate.
See Figure 3a for a valid circuit. In a valid circuit we replace every NOT gate by an equivalent
NAND gate, where one of the inputs is fixed to 1. See the replacement of gates g5, g4 and g2 in
the example in Figure 3b. Thus, we look at circuits of 2-input NAND gates where both inputs to
a NAND gate are different and every input bit of the circuit is connected to exactly one NAND
gate where the other input is fixed to 1. A circuit of this form is said to be in canonical form.
For a circuit C and a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n we denote by C(x) the output of the circuit on input x.
We model a circuit C in canonical form as a directed acyclic graph. The nodes of this graph
correspond to the input bits x1, . . . , xn, the gates g1, . . . , gK and a node 1 for all fixed inputs.
There is an arc from a gate g to a gate g′ if the output of g is input to gate g′ and there are arcs
from the fixed input and all input bits to the connected gates. We index the gates in reverse
topological order, so that all successors of a gate gk have a smaller index and the output of
gate g1 is the output of the circuit. Denote by δ+(v) the set of the direct successors of node v.
Then we have |δ+(xi)| = 1 for all input bits xi and δ+(gk) ⊆ {gk′ | k′ < k} for every gate gk. See
Figure 3 for an example of a valid circuit, its canonical form and the corresponding directed
acyclic graph.
Translation to Congestion Game Fix some integer d ≥ 2 and a parameter µ > 1 + 3d+d/2.
From a valid circuit in canonical form with input bits x1, . . . , xn, gates g1, . . . , gK and the extra
input fixed to 1, we construct a polynomial congestion game Gdµ of degree d. There are n input
players X1, . . . , Xn for every input bit, a static player P for the input fixed to 1, and K gate
players G1, . . . , GK for the output bit of every gate. G1 is sometimes called output player as g1
corresponds to the output C(x).
The idea is that every input and every gate player has a zero and a one strategy, corresponding
to the respective bit being 0 or 1. In every α-PNE we want the players to emulate the computation
of the circuit, i.e. the NAND semantics of the gates should be respected. For every gate gk, we
introduce two resources 0k and 1k. The zero (one) strategy of a player consists of the 0k′ (1k′)
resources of the direct successors in the directed acyclic graph corresponding to the circuit and
its own 0k (1k) resource (for gate players). The static player has only one strategy playing all
1k′ resources of the gates where one input is fixed to 1.
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Formally, we have
s0Xi =
{
0k | gk ∈ δ+(xi)
}
and s1Xi =
{
1k | gk ∈ δ+(xi)
}
for the zero and one strategy of an input player Xi. Recall that δ+(xi) is the set of direct
successors of xi, thus every strategy of an input player consists of exactly one resource. For a
gate player Gk we have the two strategies
s0Gk = {0k} ∪
{
0k′ | gk′ ∈ δ+(gk)
}
and s1Gk = {1k} ∪
{
1k′ | gk′ ∈ δ+(gk)
}
consisting of at most k resources each. The strategy of the static player is sP =
{
1k | gk ∈ δ+(1)
}
.
Notice that all 3 players related to a gate gk (gate player Gk and the two players corresponding
to the input bits) are different and observe that every resource 0k and 1k can be played by
exactly those 3 players.
We define the cost functions of the resources using parameter µ. The cost functions for
resources 1k are given c1k and for resources 0k by c0k , where
c1k(x) = µkxd and c0k(x) = λµkxd, with λ = 3
d/2. (8)
This construction is inspired by the lockable circuit games in Skopalik and Vöcking [33]. Our
main contribution is the use of polynomial cost functions and a simplification of introducing only
2 resources per gate (and not 3). While Skopalik and Vöcking use these games in a PLS-reduction
from Circuit/FLIP, we are interested in this gadget on its own.
Properties of the Gadget For a valid circuit C in canonical form consider the game Gdµ as
defined above. We interpret any strategy profile s of the input players as a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1}n
by setting xi = 0 if sXi = s0Xi and xi = 1 otherwise. The gate players are said to follow the
NAND semantics in a strategy profile, if for every gate gk the following holds:
• if both players corresponding to the input bits of gk play their one strategy, then the gate
player Gk plays her zero strategy;
• if at least one of the players corresponding to the input bits of gk plays her zero strategy,
then the gate player Gk plays her one strategy.
We show that for the right choice of α, the set of α-PNE in Gdµ is the same as the set of all
strategy profiles where the gate players follow the NAND semantics.
Define
ε(µ) = 3
d+d/2
µ− 1 . (9)
From our choice of µ, we obtain 3d/2 − ε(µ) > 1. For any valid circuit C in canonical form and a
valid choice of µ the following lemma holds for Gdµ.
Lemma 1. Let sX be any strategy profile for the input players X1, . . . , Xn and let x ∈ {0, 1}n
be the bit vector represented by sX . For any µ > 1 + 3d+d/2 and any 1 ≤ α < 3d/2 − ε(µ), there is
a unique α-approximate PNE3 in Gdµ where the input players play according to sX . In particular,
in this α-PNE the gate players follow the NAND semantics, and the output player G1 plays
according to C(x).
Proof. Let µ > 1 + 3d+d/2 and α < 3d/2 − ε(µ). First, we fix the input players to the strategies
given by sX and show that in any α-PNE every gate player follows the NAND semantics, as
otherwise changing to the strategy corresponding to the NAND of its input bits is an α-improving
3Which, as a matter of fact, is actually also an exact PNE.
8
move. Second, we show that in any α-PNE where the gate players follow the NAND semantics,
the input players have no incentive to change their strategy. In total we get that every strategy
profile for the input players can be extended to an α-PNE, where the gate players emulate the
circuit. Hence this α-PNE is unique.
Let sX be any strategy profile for the input players X1, . . . , Xn and let s be an α-PNE of Gdµ
where the input players play according to sX . Take Gk to be any of the gate players and let Pa
and Pb be the players corresponding to the input bits of gate gk. Note that Pa and Pb can be
other gate players or input players, and one of them can be the static player. To show that Gk
follows the NAND semantics we consider two cases.
Case 1: Both Pa and Pb play their one strategy in s. As both Pa and Pb play resource 1k
and all three players Pa, Pb and Gk are different, the cost of Gk’s one strategy is at least c1k(3).
The cost of Gk’s zero strategy is at most c0k(1) +
∑k−1
k′=1 c0k′ (3). Thus, we have
CGk(s1Gk , s−Gk)
CGk(s0Gk , s−Gk)
≥ c1k(3)
c0k(1) +
∑k−1
k′=1 c0k′ (3)
= µ
k3d
λµk +∑k−1k′=1 λµk′3d >
3d
λ
(
1
1 + 1µ−13d
)
,
where we used that 1
µk
∑k−1
k′=1 µ
k′ = 1
µk
(
µk−µ
µ−1
)
< 1µ−1 . By the definition of λ (see (8)) and ε(µ)
(see (9)), we obtain
3d
λ
(
1
1 + 1µ−13d
)
= 3d/2
(
1
1 + 1µ−13d
)
> 3d/2
(
1− 1
µ− 13
d
)
= 3d/2 − ε(µ) > α. (10)
Hence, changing from the one to the zero strategy would be an α-improving move for Gk. Thus,
Gk must follow the NAND semantics and play her zero strategy in s.
Case 2: At least one of Pa or Pb is playing her zero strategy in s. By similar arguments to
the previous case, we obtain that the cost of Gk’s zero strategy is at least c0k(2) and the cost of
the one strategy is at most c1k(2) +
∑k−1
k′=1 c1k′ (3). Then, we get that
CGk(s0Gk , s−Gk)
CGk(s1Gk , s−Gk)
≥ c0k(2)
c1k(2) +
∑k−1
k′=1 c1k′ (3)
= λµ
k2d
µk2d +∑k−1k′=1 µk′3d > λ
 1
1 + 1µ−1
(
3
2
)d
.
By the definition of λ and ε(µ), we obtain
λ
 1
1 + 1µ−1
(
3
2
)d
 > 3d/2( 11 + 1µ−13d
)
> 3d/2
(
1− 1
µ− 13
d
)
= 3d/2 − ε(µ) > α. (11)
Hence, changing from the zero to the one strategy would be an α-improving move for Gk. Thus,
Gk must follow the NAND semantics and play her one strategy in s.
We just showed that, in an α-PNE, every gate player must follow the NAND semantics. This
implies that there is at most one α-PNE where the input players play according to sX , since the
NAND semantics uniquely define the strategy of the remaining players. To conclude the proof,
we must argue that this yields in fact an α-PNE, meaning that the input players are also ‘locked’
to their strategies in sX and have no incentive to deviate. To that end, let s be a strategy profile
PNE of Gdµ where the gate players follow the NAND semantics and let Xi be any of the input
players. Recall that every input bit xi is connected to exactly one gate, say gk = gk(i), while the
other input is fixed to 1. To show that Xi does not have an incentive to change her strategy, we
consider two cases.
Case 1: Xi plays her zero strategy in s. As Gk follows the NAND semantics in s and the
other input of gk is fixed to 1, we know that Gk must be playing her one strategy. This incurs a
cost of c0k(1) = λµk to Xi. On the other hand, if Xi changed to her one strategy this would
incur a cost of c1k(3) = µk3d.
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Case 2: Xi plays her one strategy in s. As Gk follows the NAND semantics in s and the other
input of gk is fixed to 1, we know that Gk must be playing her zero strategy. Thus, incurring a
cost of c1k(2) = µk2d for Xi. On the other hand, if Xi changed to her zero strategy this would
incur a cost of c0k(2) = λµk2d.
In both cases it is α-dominating for Xi not to change her strategy, since α < 3d/2 − ε(µ) <
3d/2 = 3d/λ = λ.
We are now ready to show our main result of this section; using the circuit game de-
scribed above, we show NP-hardness of deciding whether approximate equilibria with additional
properties exist.
Theorem 2. The following problems are NP-hard, even for unweighted polynomial congestion
games of degree d ≥ 2, for all α ∈ [1, 3d/2) and all z > 0:
• “Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain subset of players are playing a
specific strategy profile?”
• “Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain resource is used by at least
one player?”
• “Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain player has cost at most z?”
Proof. For the first problem we reduce from Circuit Satisfiability: given a Boolean circuit
with n input bits and one output bit, is there an assignment of the input bits where the output
of the circuit is 1? This problem is NP-hard even for circuits consisting only of 2-input NAND
gates [28]. Let C ′ be a Boolean circuit of 2-input NAND gates. We transform C ′ into a valid
circuit C by connecting every input bit to a NOT gate and the output of this NOT gate to
all gates connected to the input bit in C ′. Thus, C ′(x) = C(x¯), where x¯ denotes the vector
obtained from x ∈ {0, 1}n by flipping every bit. Hence, we have that C ′ is a YES-instance to
Circuit Satisfiability if and only if C is a YES-instance.
Let α ∈ [1, 3d/2), then there is an ε > 0 with α < 3d/2 − ε. We set µ = 1 + 3d+d/2min{ε,1} . For this
choice of µ, we obtain ε(µ) ≤ ε and thus 3d/2 − ε(µ) ≥ 3d/2 − ε > α. From the canonical form of
C ′ we construct4 the game Gdµ. The subset of players we are looking at is the output player G1
and the specific strategy for G1 is her one strategy s1G1 . We show that there is an α-PNE where
G1 plays s1G1 if and only if C is a YES-instance to Circuit Satisfiability.
Suppose there is a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1}n such that C(x) = 1. Let sX be the strategy profile
for the input players of Gdµ corresponding to x. Since 3d/2 − ε(µ) > α, Lemma 1 holds for Gdµ
and α. Hence, the profile sX can be extended to an α-PNE where G1 plays according to C(x).
Thus, there is an α-PNE where G1 plays s1G1 .
On the other hand, suppose for all bit vectors x ∈ {0, 1}n it holds C(x) = 0. Again, by
Lemma 1 we know that for any choice of strategies for the input players, the only α-PNE is a
profile where the gate players follow the NAND semantics. Thus in this case, G1 is playing s0G1
in any α-PNE.
To show NP-hardness of the second problem we reduce from the first part of this theorem.
From the proof above we know that this problem is even NP-hard if the given subset of players
consists only of one player. Let (G, P, sP ) be an instance of this problem, i.e. G is an unweighted
polynomial congestion game of degree d, P is one of its players and sP is a specific strategy for
P . We construct a new game G′ from G by adding a new resource r with cost 0 to the strategy
4To be precise, the description of the game Gdµ involves the quantities µ = 1 + 3d+
d/2
min{ε,1} and λ = 3
d/2, which in
general might be irrational. In order to incorporate this game into our reduction, it is enough to choose a rational
µ such that µ > 1 + 3d+
d/2
min{ε,1} , and a rational λ such that α
(
1 + 1
µ−13
d
)
< λ < 3
d
α
(
1+ 1
µ−1 3d
) . In this way, Gdµ is
described entirely via rational numbers, while preserving the inequalities in (10) and (11).
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sP . The rest of the game G stays unchanged. As r does not incur any cost, the set of α-PNE in
G′ and G are the same. Thus, there exists an α-PNE in G′ where the resource r is used by at
least one player if and only if there is an α-PNE in G where P plays sP .
The hardness of the third problem is shown by a reduction from Circuit Satisfiability,
similar to the proof for the first problem. For α ∈ [1, 3d/2) we choose µ as before, so that
Lemma 1 holds for α and the game Gdµ for a suitable circuit. Let C ′ be an instance of Circuit
Satisfiability. By negating the output of C ′, we obtain a circuit C ′. As before we transform
C ′ to a valid circuit C, so that C ′(x) = ¬C(x¯) holds. From the canonical form of C we construct
the game Gdµ. Note that the output player G1 of this game is the output of a gate, where one
of the inputs is fixed to 1, as we negated the output of C ′ by connecting the output of C ′ to a
NOT gate. We show that there is an α-PNE in Gdµ, where G1 has cost at most λµ, if and only if
C ′ is a YES-instance to Circuit Satisfiability.
Suppose there is a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1}n with C ′(x) = 1, then there is a vector x¯ with
C(x¯) = 0. Let sX be the strategy profile for the input players of Gdµ corresponding to x¯. By
Lemma 1 this profile can be extended to an α-PNE, where G1 is playing her zero strategy.
As the gate players follow the NAND semantics in this PNE, the cost of player G1 is exactly
c01(1) = λµ.
If, on the other hand, for all bit vectors x ∈ {0, 1}n we have C ′(x) = 0, then for all x¯ ∈ {0, 1}n
we have C(x¯) = 1. Thus, using Lemma 1 we know that in every α-PNE G1 plays her one
strategy. As G1 follows the NAND semantics in any α-PNE and the player corresponding to
one of the inputs of g1 is the static player, we obtain that the cost of G1 is exactly c11(2) = µ2d.
Noticing that λ = 3d/2 < 2d, we have deduced the following: either C ′ is a YES-instance, and Gdµ
has an α-PNE where G1 has a cost of (at most) λµ; or C ′ is a NO-instance, and for every α-PNE
of Gdµ, G1 has a cost of (at least) 2dµ. This immediately implies that determining whether an
α-PNE exists in which a certain player has cost at most z is NP-hard for λµ < z < 2dµ. To
prove that the problem remains NP-hard for an arbitrary z > 0, simply take a rational c such
that cλµ < z < c2dµ and rescale all costs of the resources in Gdµ by c.
5 Hardness of Existence
In this section we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether a polynomial congestion game has
an α-PNE. For this we use a black-box reduction: our hard instance is obtained by combining
any (weighted) polynomial congestion game G without α-PNE (i.e., the game from Section 3)
with the circuit gadget of the previous section. To achieve this, it would be convenient to make
some assumptions on the game G, which however do not influence the existence or nonexistence
of approximate equilibria:
Structural Properties of G Without loss of generality, we assume that a weighted polynomial
congestion game of degree d has the following structural properties.
• No player has an empty strategy. If, for some player i, ∅ ∈ Si, then this strategy would
be α-dominating for i. Removing i from the game description would not affect the
(non)existence of (approximate) equilibria5.
• No player has zero weight. If a player i had zero weight, her strategy would not influence
the costs of the strategies of the other players. Again, removing i from the game description
would not affect the (non)existence of equilibria.
5By this we mean, if G has (resp. does not have) α-PNE, then G˜, obtained by removing player i from the game,
still has (resp. still does not have) α-PNE.
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• Each resource e has a monomial cost function with a strictly positive coefficient, i.e.
ce(x) = aexke where ae > 0 and ke ∈ {0, . . . , d}. If a resource had a more general cost
function ce(x) = ae,0 + ae,1x+ . . .+ ae,dxd, we could split it into at most d+ 1 resources
with (positive) monomial costs, ce,0(x) = ae,0, ce,1(x) = ae,1x, . . . , ce,d(x) = ae,dxd. These
monomial cost resources replace the original resource, appearing on every strategy that
included e.
• No resource e has a constant cost function. If a resource e had a constant cost function
ce(x) = ae,0, we could replace it by new resources having monomial cost. For each player i
of weight wi, replace resource e by a resource ei with monomial cost cei(x) =
ae,0
wi
x, that
is used exclusively by player i on her strategies that originally had resource e. Note that
cei(wi) = ae,0, so that this modification does not change the player’s costs, neither has
an effect on the (non)existence of approximate equilibria. If a resource has cost function
constantly equal to zero, we can simply remove it from the description of the game.
For a game having the above properties, we define the (strictly positive) quantities
amin = min
e∈E
ae, W =
∑
i∈N
wi, cmax =
∑
e∈E
ce(W ). (12)
Note that cmax is an upper bound on the cost of any player on any strategy profile.
Rescaling of G In our construction of the combined game we have to make sure that the
weights of the players in G are smaller than the weights of the players in the circuit gadget. We
introduce the following rescaling argument.
For any γ ∈ (0, 1] define the game G˜γ , where we rescale the player weights and resource cost
coefficients in G as
w˜i = γwi, a˜e = γd+1−keae, c˜e(x) = a˜exke . (13)
This changes the quantities in (12) for G˜γ as
a˜min ≥ γdamin, W˜ = γW, c˜max = γd+1cmax.
In G˜γ the player costs are all uniformly scaled as C˜i(s) = γd+1Ci(s), so that the Nash dynamics
and the (non)existence of equilibria are preserved.
The next lemma formalizes the combination of both game gadgets and, furthermore, estab-
lishes the gap-introduction in the equilibrium factor. Using it, we will derive our key hardness
tool of Theorem 3.
Lemma 2. Fix any integer d ≥ 2 and real α ≥ 1. Suppose there exists a weighted polynomial
congestion game G of degree d that does not have an α-approximate PNE. Then, for any circuit
C there exists a game G˜C with the following property: the sets of α-approximate PNE and exact
PNE of G˜C coincide and are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of satisfying assignments
of C. In particular, one of the following holds: either
1. C has a satisfying assignment, in which case G˜C has an exact PNE (and thus, also an
α-approximate PNE); or
2. C has no satisfying assignments, in which case G˜C has no α-approximate PNE (and thus,
also no exact PNE).
Proof. Let G be a congestion game as in the statement of the theorem having the above mentioned
structural properties. Recalling that weighted polynomial congestion games of degree d have
d-PNE [3], this implies that α < d < 3d/2. Fix some 0 < ε < 3d/2 − α and take µ ≥ 1 + 3d+d/2min{ε,1} ;
in this way α < 3d/2 − ε ≤ 3d/2 − ε(µ).
12
1X1
...
Xn
G1
Gdµ
01
11
• •
• •
G˜γ
i j
dummy
Figure 4: Merging a circuit game (on the left) and a game without approximate equilibria (on the right). Changes
to the subgames are indicated by solid arrows. The new one strategy of G1 consists of 11 and all resources in G˜γ ,
while the zero strategy stays unchanged. The players of G˜γ get a new strategy (the dummy resource), and keep
their old strategies playing in G˜γ .
Given a circuit C we construct the game G˜C as follows. We combine the game Gdµ whose
Nash dynamics model the NAND semantics of C, as described in Section 4, with the game G˜γ
obtained from G via the aforementioned rescaling. We choose γ ∈ (0, 1] sufficiently small such
that the following three inequalities hold for the quantities in (12) for G:
γW < 1, γ
∑
e∈E
ae <
µ
µ− 1
(3
2
)d
, γα2 <
amin
cmax
. (14)
Thus, the set of players in G˜C corresponds to the (disjoint) union of the static, input and gate
players in Gdµ (which all have weights 1) and the players in G˜γ (with weights w˜i). We also
consider a new dummy resource with constant cost cdummy(x) = a˜minα . Thus, the set of resources
corresponds to the (disjoint) union of the gate resources 0k, 1k in Gdµ, the resources in G˜γ , and
the dummy resource. We augment the strategy space of the players as follows:
• each input player or gate player of Gdµ that is not the output player G1 has the same
strategies as in Gdµ (i.e. either the zero or the one strategy);
• the zero strategy of the output player G1 is the same as in Gdµ, but her one strategy is
augmented with every resource in G˜γ ; that is, s1G1 = {11} ∪ E(G˜γ);
• each player i in G˜γ keeps her original strategies as in G˜γ , and gets a new dummy strategy
si,dummy = {dummy}.
A graphical representation of the game G˜C can be seen in Fig. 4.
To finish the proof, we need to show that every α-PNE of G˜C is an exact PNE and corresponds
to a satisfying assignment of C; and, conversely, that every satisfying assignment of C gives rise
to an exact PNE of G˜C (and thus, an α-PNE as well).
Suppose that s is an α-PNE of G˜C , and let sX denote the strategy profile restricted to the
input players of Gdµ. Then, as in the proof of Lemma 1, every gate player that is not the output
player must respect the NAND semantics, and this is an α-dominating strategy. For the output
player, either sX is a non-satisfying assignment, in which case the zero strategy of G1 was
α-dominating, and this remains α-dominating in the game G˜C (since only the cost of the one
strategy increased for the output player); or sX is a satisfying assignment. In the second case,
we now argue that the one strategy of G1 remains α-dominating. The cost of the output player
on the zero strategy is at least c01(2) = λµ2d, and the cost on the one strategy is at most
c11(2) +
∑
e∈E
c˜e(1 + γW ) = µ2d +
∑
e∈E
γd+1−keae(1 + γW )ke < µ2d + γ
∑
e∈E
ae2d < µ2d +
µ
µ− 13
d,
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where we used the first and second bounds from (14). Thus, the ratio between the costs is at
least
λµ2d
µ2d + µµ−13d
= λ
 1
1 + 1µ−1
(
3
2
)d
 > 3d/2( 11 + 1µ−13d
)
> 3d/2 − ε(µ) > α.
Given that the gate players must follow the NAND semantics, the input players are also
locked to their strategies (i.e. they have no incentive to change) due to the proof of Lemma 1.
The only players left to consider are the players from G˜γ . First we show that, since s is an α-PNE,
the output player must be playing her one strategy. If this was not the case, then each dummy
strategy of a player in G˜γ is α-dominated by any other strategy: the dummy strategy incurs a
cost of a˜minα ≥ γd aminα , whereas any other strategy would give a cost of at most c˜max = γd+1cmax
(this is because the output player is not playing any of the resources in G˜γ). The ratio between
the costs is thus at least
γdamin
γd+1cmaxα
= amin
γcmaxα
> α.
Since the dummy strategies are α-dominated, the players in G˜γ must be playing on their original
sets of strategies. The only way for s to be an α-PNE would be if G had an α-PNE to begin with,
which yields a contradiction. Thus, the output player is playing the one strategy (and hence, is
present in every resource in G˜γ). In such a case, we can conclude that each dummy strategy is
now α-dominating. If a player i in G˜γ is not playing a dummy strategy, she is playing at least
one resource in G˜γ , say resource e. Her cost is at least c˜e(1 + w˜i) = a˜e(1 + w˜i)ke > a˜e ≥ a˜min
(the strict inequality holds since, by the structural properties of our game, all of a˜e, w˜i and ke
are strictly positive quantities). On the other hand, the cost of playing the dummy strategy is
a˜min
α . Thus, the ratio between the costs is greater than α.
We have concluded that, if s is an α-PNE of G˜C , then sX corresponds to a satisfying
assignment of C, all the gate players are playing according to the NAND semantics, the output
player is playing the one strategy, and all players of G˜γ are playing the dummy strategies. In this
case, we also have observed that each player’s current strategy is α-dominating, so the strategy
profile is an exact PNE. To finish the proof, we need to argue that every satisfying assignment
gives rise to a unique α-PNE. Let sX be the strategy profile corresponding to this assignment
for the input players in Gdµ. Then, as before, there is one and exactly one α-PNE s in G˜C that
agrees with sX ; namely, each gate player follows the NAND semantics, the output player plays
the one strategy, and the players in G˜γ play the dummy strategies.
Theorem 3. For any integer d ≥ 2 and real α ≥ 1, suppose there exists a weighted polynomial
congestion game which does not have an α-approximate PNE. Then it is NP-hard to decide
whether (weighted) polynomial congestion games of degree d have an α-approximate PNE. If in
addition α is polynomial-time computable,6 the aforementioned problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Let d ≥ 2 and α ≥ 1. Let G be a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree d that
has no α-PNE; this means that for every strategy profile s there exists a player i and a strategy
s′i 6= si such that Ci(si, s−i) > α · Ci(s′i, s−i). Note that the functions Ci are polynomials of
degree d and hence they are continuous on the weights wi and the coefficients ae appearing on
the cost functions. Hence, any arbitrarily small perturbation of the wi, ae does not change the
sign of the above inequality. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that all wi, ae are
rational numbers. By a similar reasoning, we can let α¯ > α be a rational number sufficiently
close to α such that G still does not have an α¯-PNE.
Next, we consider the game G˜γ obtained from G by rescaling, as in the proof of Lemma 2,
but with α¯ playing the role of α. Notice that the rescaling is done via the choice of a sufficiently
small γ, according to (14), and hence in particular we can take γ to be a sufficiently small
6Recall the definition of polynomial-time computable real number at the end of Section 2.
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rational. In this way, all the player weights and coefficients in the cost of resources are rational
numbers scaled by a rational number and hence rationals.
Finally, we are able to provide the desired NP reduction from Circuit Satisfiability.
Given a Boolean circuit C ′ built with 2-input NAND gates, transform it into a valid circuit C in
canonical form. From C we can construct in polynomial time the game G˜C as described in the
proof of Lemma 2. The ‘circuit part’, i.e. the game Gdµ, is obtained in polynomial time from C,
as in the proof of Theorem 2; the description of the game G˜γ involves only rational numbers,
and hence the game can be represented by a constant number of bits (i.e. independent of the
circuit C). Similarly, the additional dummy strategy has a constant delay of a˜min/α¯, and can be
represented with a single rational number. Merging both Gdµ and G˜γ into a single game G˜C can
be done in linear time. Since C has a satisfying assignment iff G˜C has an α-PNE (or α¯-PNE),
this concludes that the problem described is NP-hard.
If α is polynomial-time computable, the problem is clearly in NP: given a weighted polynomial
congestion game of degree d and a strategy profile s, one can check if s is an α-PNE by computing
the ratios between the cost of each player in s and their cost for each possible deviation, and
comparing these ratios with α.
Combining the hardness result of Theorem 3 together with the nonexistence result of
Theorem 1 we get the following corollary, which is the main result of this section.
Corollary 1. For any integer d ≥ 2 and real α ∈ [1, α(d)), it is NP-hard to decide whether
(weighted) polynomial congestion games of degree d have an α-approximate PNE, where α(d) =
Ω˜(
√
d) is the same as in Theorem 1. If in addition α is polynomial-time computable, the
aforementioned problem is NP-complete.
Notice that, in the proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 3, we constructed a polynomial-time
reduction from Circuit Satisfiability to the problem of determining whether a given con-
gestion game has an α-PNE. Not only does this reduction map YES-instances of one problem
to YES-instances of the other, but it also induces a bijection between the sets of satisfying
assignments of a circuit C and α-PNE of the corresponding game G˜C . That is, this reduction
is parsimonious. As a consequence, we can directly lift hardness of problems associated with
counting satisfying assignments to Circuit Satisfiability into problems associated with
counting α-PNE of congestion games:
Corollary 2. Let k ≥ 1 and d ≥ 2 be integers and α ∈ [1, α(d)) where α(d) = Ω˜(√d) is the
same as in Theorem 1. Then
• it is #P-hard to count the number of α-approximate PNE of (weighted) polynomial conges-
tion games of degree d;
• it is NP-hard to decide whether a (weighted) polynomial congestion game of degree d has
at least k distinct α-approximate PNE.
Proof. The hardness of the first problem comes from the #P-hardness of the counting version of
Circuit Satisfiability (see, e.g., [28, Ch. 18]). For the hardness of the second problem, it is
immediate to see that the following problem is NP-complete, for any fixed integer k ≥ 1: given
a circuit C, decide whether there are at least k distinct satisfying assignments for C (simply
add “dummy” variables to the description of the circuit).
6 General Cost Functions
In this final section we leave the domain of polynomial latencies and study the existence
of approximate equilibria in general congestion games having arbitrary (nondecreasing) cost
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functions. Our parameter of interest, with respect to which both our positive and negative
results are going to be stated, is the number of players n. We start by showing that n-PNE
always exist:
Theorem 4. Every weighted congestion game with n players and arbitrary (nondecreasing) cost
functions has an n-approximate PNE.
Proof. Fix a weighted congestion game with n ≥ 2 players, some strategy profile s, and a possible
deviation s′i of player i. First notice that we can bound the change in the cost of any other
player j 6= i as
Cj(s′i, s−i)− Cj(s) =
∑
e∈sj
ce
(
xe(s′i, s−i)
)−∑
e∈sj
ce(xe(s))
=
∑
e∈sj∩(s′i\si)
[
ce
(
xe(s′i, s−i)
)− ce(xe(s))]
+
∑
e∈sj∩(si\s′i)
[
ce
(
xe(s′i, s−i)
)− ce(xe(s))] (15)
≤
∑
e∈sj∩(s′i\si)
[
ce
(
xe(s′i, s−i)
)− ce(xe(s))]
≤
∑
e∈s′i
ce
(
xe(s′i, s−i)
)
= Ci(s′i, s−i), (16)
the first inequality holding due to the fact that the second sum in (15) contains only nonpositive
terms (since the latency functions are nondecreasing).
Next, define the social cost C(s) = ∑i∈N Ci(s). Adding the above inequality over all players
j 6= i (of which there are n− 1) and rearranging, we successively derive:
∑
j 6=i
Cj(s′i, s−i)−
∑
j 6=i
Cj(s) ≤ (n− 1)Ci(s′i, s−i)(
C(s′i, s−i)− Ci(s′i, s−i)
)− (C(s)− Ci(s)) ≤ (n− 1)Ci(s′i, s−i)
C(s′i, s−i)− C(s) ≤ nCi(s′i, s−i)− Ci(s). (17)
We conclude that, if s′i is an n-improving deviation for player i (i.e., nCi(s′i, s−i) < Ci(s)), then
the social cost must strictly decrease after this move. Thus, any (global or local) minimizer of
the social cost must be an n-PNE (the existence of such a minimizer is guaranteed by the fact
that the strategy spaces are finite).
The above proof not only establishes the existence of n-approximate equilibria in general
congestion games, but also highlights a few additional interesting features. First, due to the key
inequality (17), n-PNE are reachable via sequences of n-improving moves, in addition to arising
also as minimizers of the social cost function. These attributes give a nice “constructive” flavour
to Theorem 4. Secondly, exactly because social cost optima are n-PNE, the Price of Stability7
of n-PNE is optimal (i.e., equal to 1) as well. Another, more succinct way, to interpret these
observations is within the context of approximate potentials (see, e.g., [6, 8, 9]); (17) establishes
that the social cost itself is always an n-approximate potential of any congestion game.
Next, we design a family of games that do not admit Θ
(
n
lnn
)
-PNE, thus nearly matching
the upper bound Theorem 4.
7The Price of Stability (PoS) is a well-established and extensively studied notion in algorithmic game theory,
originally studied in [2, 10]. It captures the minimum approximation ratio of the social cost between equilibria
and the optimal solution (see, e.g., [7, 9]); in other words, it is the best-case analogue of the the Price of Anarchy
(PoA) notion of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [23].
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Theorem 5. For any integer n ≥ 2, there exist weighted congestion games with n players and
general cost functions that do not have α-approximate PNE for any α < Φn−1, where Φm ∼ mlnm
is the unique positive solution of (x+ 1)m = xm+1.
Proof. For any integer n ≥ 2, let ξ = Φn−1 be the positive solution of (x+ 1)n−1 = xn. Then,
equivalently, (
1 + 1
ξ
)n−1
= ξ. (18)
Furthermore, as we mentioned in Section 2, ξ > 1 and asymptotically Φn−1 ∼ nlnn .
Consider the following congestion game Gn. There are n = m + 1 players 0, 1, . . . ,m,
where player i has weight wi = 1/2i. In particular, this means that for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:∑m
k=iwk < wi−1 ≤ w0. Furthermore, there are 2(m+ 1) resources a0, a1, . . . , am, b0, b1, . . . , bm,
where resources ai and bi have the same cost function ci given by
ca0(x) = cb0(x) = c0(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ w0,
0, otherwise;
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
cai(x) = cbi(x) = ci(x) =
1ξ
(
1 + 1ξ
)i−1
, if x ≥ w0 + wi,
0, otherwise.
The strategy set of player 0 and of all players i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are, respectively,
S0 = {{a0, . . . , am}, {b0, . . . , bm}}, and Si = {{a0, . . . , ai−1, bi}, {b0, . . . , bi−1, ai}}.
We show that this game has no α-PNE, for any α < ξ, by proving that in any outcome there
is at least one player that can deviate and improve her cost by a factor of at least ξ. Due to
symmetry it is sufficient to consider the following two kinds of outcomes:
Case 1: Player 0 is alone on resource a0.
Then player 0 must have chosen {a0, . . . , am}, and all other players i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} must have
chosen strategy {b0, . . . , bi−1, ai}. In this outcome, player 0 has a cost of
c0(w0) +
m∑
i=1
ci(w0 + wi) = 1 +
1
ξ
m∑
i=1
(
1 + 1
ξ
)i−1
=
(
1 + 1
ξ
)m
= ξ,
where the last equality follows by the fact that m = n− 1 and (18). Deviating to {b0, . . . , bm},
player 0 would get a cost of
c0(w0 + . . .+ wm) +
m∑
i=1
ci
w0 + m∑
j=i+1
wj
 = 1 + 0.
Thus player 0 can improve by a factor of at least ξ.
Case 2: Player 0 is sharing resource a0 with at least one other player.
Let j be the smallest index of such a player, i.e., player j plays {a0, . . . , aj−1, bj} and all
players i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} have chosen strategy {b0, . . . , bi−1, ai}. In such a profile the cost of
player j is at least
c0(w0 + wj) +
j−1∑
i=1
ci(w0 + wi + wj) = 1 +
1
ξ
j−1∑
i=1
(
1 + 1
ξ
)i−1
=
(
1 + 1
ξ
)j−1
,
while deviating to j’s other strategy would result in a cost of at most
c0
(
m∑
i=1
wi
)
+
j−1∑
i=1
ci
 m∑
k=i+1
wk
+ cj
w0 + m∑
k=j
wk
 = 0 + 0 + 1
ξ
(
1 + 1
ξ
)j−1
.
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Thus player j can improve by a factor of at least ξ.
Similar to the spirit of the rest of our paper so far, we’d like to show an NP-hardness result
for deciding existence of α-PNE for general games as well. We do exactly that in the following
theorem, where now α grows as Θ˜(n). Again, we use the circuit gadget and combine it with the
game from the previous nonexistence Theorem 5. The main difference to the previous reductions
is that now n is part of the input. On the other hand we are not restricted to polynomial
latencies, so we use step functions having a single breakpoint.
Theorem 6. Let ε > 0, and let α˜ : N≥2 −→ R be any sequence of reals such that 1 ≤ α˜(n) <
Φn−1
1+ε = Θ˜(n), where Φm ∼ mlnm is the unique positive solution of (x+ 1)m = xm+1. Then, it is
NP-hard to decide whether a (weighted) congestion game with n players has an α˜(n)-approximate
PNE. If in addition α˜ is a polynomial-time computable real sequence (as defined in Section 2),
the aforementioned problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Recall that we have Φn−1 ∼ nlnn . Given ε > 0, without loss of generality assume ε < 1,
so that 1 + ε/3 < (1 + ε)(1− ε/3). Let n0, ` ∈ N be large enough natural numbers such that
1 + 1
`
<
(1 + ε)(1− ε3)
1 + ε3
and
(
1− ε3
)
n
lnn ≤ Φn−1 ≤
(
1 + ε3
)
n
lnn for all n ≥ n0.
(19)
We will again reduce from Circuit Satisfiability: given a circuit C, we must construct
(in polynomial time) a game G˜, say with n˜ players, that has an α˜(n˜)-PNE if and only if C
has a satisfying assignment. Without loss of generality assume that C is in canonical form (as
described in Section 4); add also one extra gate that negates the output of C, making this the
new output of a circuit C¯, say with m inputs and K NAND gates. Let s = m+K + 1, n = `s,
and take a large enough integer d such that 3d/2 > Φn−1. Note that s, n and a suitable d can all
be found in time polynomial in the description of C. To conclude the preliminaries of this proof,
assume also without loss of generality that s ≥ n0; if s is bounded by a constant, determining
whether C has a satisfying assignment can be done in constant time.
Next, given C¯ and d, construct the game Gdµ where µ is such that 3d/2 − ε(µ) > Φn−1,
as in Section 4. Notice that Gdµ can be computed in polynomial time from C, and that the
Φn−1-improving Nash dynamics of this game emulate the computation of the circuit. Consider
also the game Gn with n players from Theorem 5 that does not have α-PNE for any α < Φn−1.
We would like to merge Gdµ and Gn into a single game G˜, in such a way that G˜ has an
approximate PNE if and only if C has a satisfying assignment. Following the same technique
as in Lemma 2, we would like to extend the strategies of the output player of Gdµ to include
resources that are used by players in Gn. For this technique to work, we must rescale the weights
and cost functions in Gn. In particular, we divide all weights of the players in Gn by 2 (so that
the sum of the weights of all the players is less than 1) and halve the breakpoints of the cost
functions accordingly. We also add a new dummy resource with cost function
cdummy(x) =
{
Φ2n−1, if x ≥ 1,
0, otherwise;
We are now ready to describe the congestion game G˜ that is obtained by merging the circuit
game Gdµ with the (rescaling of) game Gn. Note that this game has n+ s = (`+ 1)s players: s
from the circuit game (which all have weight 1) and n from the nonexistence gadget. The set
of resources corresponds to the union of the gate resources of Gdµ, the resources in Gn, and the
dummy resource. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 2,
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• we do not change the strategies of the players in Gdµ, with the exception of the output
player G1;
• the zero strategy of the output player G1 remains the same as in Gdµ, but her one strategy
is augmented with the dummy resource; that is, s1G1 = {11,dummy};
• each player i in Gn keeps her original strategies, and gets a new dummy strategy si,dummy =
{dummy}.
With the above description,8 the only thing left to prove NP-hardness is that C has a
satisfying assignment if and only if G˜ has an α˜(n+ s)-PNE. The proof follows the same approach
as in Lemma 2. Letting α < Φn−1, we suppose that G˜ has an α-PNE, say s, and proceed to
prove that C has a satisfying assignment.
As before, if s is an α-PNE, then every gate player that is not the output player must
respect the NAND semantics, and this strategy is α-dominating. For the output player, the cost
of her zero strategy remains the same, and the cost of her one strategy increases by exactly
Φ2n−1 < 3d < µµ−13d. Hence, if sX is a satisfying assignment, then the zero strategy of the output
player (which negates the output of the original circuit C) remains α-dominating; on the other
hand, if sX is not a satisfying assignment, then the ratio between the costs of the zero strategy
and the one strategy of the output player is at least
c01(2)
c11(2) + Φ2n−1
>
λµ2d
µ2d + µµ−13d
= λ
 1
1 + 1µ−1
(
3
2
)d
 > 3d/2( 11 + 1µ−13d
)
> 3d/2 − ε(µ) > α.
Hence, respecting the NAND semantics remains α-dominating for the output player as well. As
a consequence, the input players are also locked to their strategies (i.e. they have no incentive to
change).
Now, if the output player happened to be playing her one strategy, this could not be an
α-PNE. For each of the players in Gn, the dummy strategy would incur a cost of Φ2n−1, whereas
any other strategy would give a cost of at most Φn−1. Thus the dummy strategy would be
Φn−1-dominated, and the players in Gn must be playing on their original sets of strategies, for
which we know that α-PNE do not occur.
The above argument proves that, in an α-PNE, the output player must be playing her zero
strategy. Since the output player, by construction, negates the output of C, this implies that C
must have a satisfying assignment. This also implies that the congestion on the dummy resource
cannot reach the breakpoint of 1, and hence it would be α-dominating for each of the players in
Gn to play her dummy strategy (and incur a cost of 0). Thus, s is an exact PNE as well.
For the converse direction, suppose C has a satisfying assignment sX . Then this can be
extended to an α-PNE of G˜ in which the input players play according to sX , the gate players
play according to the NAND semantics, the output player of Gdµ plays the zero strategy, and
each player in Gn plays the dummy strategy.
We have proven that, for any α < Φn−1, C has a satisfying assignment iff G˜ has an α-PNE.
To conclude the proof, we verify that α˜(n+ s) < Φn−1:
α˜(n+ s) < Φn+s−11 + ε
≤ 1 +
ε
3
1 + ε
n+ s
ln(n+ s)
8This almost concludes the description of the game – the only problem is that some of the cost functions of
the game are defined in terms of Φn−1, which is not a rational number. To make the proof formally correct, one
can approximate Φn−1 sufficiently close by a rational Φ¯n−1 < Φn−1. We omit the details.
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≤ 1 +
ε
3
(1 + ε)(1− ε3)
(n+ s) lnn
n ln(n+ s) Φn−1
<
(1 + sn)(1 +
ε
3)
(1 + ε)(1− ε3)
Φn−1
=
(1 + 1` )(1 +
ε
3)
(1 + ε)(1− ε3)
Φn−1 < Φn−1.
The first inequality comes from the assumption on α˜, the second and third come from the upper
and lower bounds on Φn from (19) and the fact that n+ s ≥ n ≥ s ≥ n0, the fourth comes from
the trivial bound lnn < ln(n+ s), the equality comes from the definition of n = `s, and the final
step comes from the choice of ` in (19).
We conclude that the problem of deciding whether a (weighted) congestion game with n
players has an α˜(n)-PNE is NP-hard. If in addition α˜ is a polynomial-time computable real
sequence, the problem is also in NP; given a game with n players and a (candidate) strategy
profile, verify that this is an α˜(n)-PNE by iterating over all possible moves of all players and
verifying that none of these are α˜(n)-improving.
7 Discussion and Future Directions
In this paper we showed that weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of degree
d do not have α-PNE for α < α(d) = Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
. For general cost functions, we proved that
n-PNE always exist whereas α-PNE in general do not, where n is the number of players and
α < Φn−1 = Θ
(
n
lnn
)
. We also transformed the nonexistence results into complexity-theoretic
results, establishing that deciding whether such α-PNE exist is itself an NP-hard problem.
We now identify two possible directions for follow-up work. A first obvious question would
be to reduce the nonexistence gap between Ω
(√
d
ln d
)
(derived in Theorem 1 of this paper) and d
(shown in [3]) for polynomials of degree d; similarly for the gap between Θ
(
n
lnn
)
(Theorem 5)
and n (Theorem 4) for general cost functions and n players. Notice that all current methods for
proving upper bounds (i.e., existence) are essentially based on potential function arguments;
thus it might be necessary to come up with novel ideas and techniques to overcome the current
gaps.
A second direction would be to study the complexity of finding α-PNE, when they are
guaranteed to exist. For example, for polynomials of degree d, we know that d-improving
dynamics eventually reach a d-PNE [3], and so finding such an approximate equilibrium lies
in the complexity class PLS of local search problems (see, e.g., [21, 32]). However, from a
complexity theory perspective the only known lower bound is the PLS-completeness of finding
an exact equilibrium for unweighted congestion games [12] (and this is true even for d = 1, i.e.,
affine cost functions; see [1]). On the other hand, we know that dO(d)-PNE can be computed in
polynomial time (see, e.g., [5, 13, 16]). It would be then very interesting to establish a “gradation”
in complexity (e.g., from NP-hardness to PLS-hardness to P) as the parameter α increases from
1 to dO(d).
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A Technical Lemmas
Lemma 3. For any integer d ≥ 2 define the sequence
g(d) =
(
1 + d−
1
2(kd+1)
)kd
+ 2
√
d
ln d
(
1 + ln d2d
)d where kd = ⌈ ln d2 ln ln d
⌉
.
Then limd→∞ g(d) = 1.
Proof. Define
g1(d) =
(
1 + d−
1
2(kd+1)
)kd
and g2(d) =
2
√
d(
1 + ln d2d
)d
ln d
so that g(d) = g1(d) + g2(d). We will show the desired convergence by establishing that
limd→∞ g1(d) = 1 and limd→∞ g2(d) = 0. We will make use of the following inequalities (see,
e.g., [26, Eq. 4.5.13]):
exp
(
xy
x+ y
)
<
(
1 + x
y
)y
< exp(x), for all x, y > 0. (20)
First, we show limd→∞ g1(d) = 1. As d and kd are positive, we have g1(d) > 1 for every d.
Furthermore, g1 is increasing in kd, and kd < ln d2 ln ln d + 1. Thus,
g1(d) <
(
1 + d
− 1ln d
ln ln d+4
) ln d
2 ln ln d+1
.
Using the second inequality of (20) with y = ln d2 ln ln d + 1 and x = yd
− ln ln dln d+4 ln ln d , we can further
bound
g1(d) < exp
( ln d
2 ln ln d + 1
d
ln ln d
ln d+4 ln ln d
)
. (21)
We will show that the argument of the exponential function on the r.h.s. of (21) goes to 0 for
d→∞, thus proving the claim. Replacing ln d = exp(ln ln d) in the numerator and d = exp(ln d)
in the denominator, that argument can be written as
exp(ln ln d)
(
1
2 ln ln d +
1
ln d
)
exp
(
ln d ln ln d
ln d+4 ln ln d
) = ( 12 ln ln d + 1ln d
)
exp
(
4(ln ln d)2
ln d+ ln ln d
)
. (22)
The argument of the exponential function on the r.h.s. of (22) goes to 0, as ln d is the dominating
term in the denominator for d→∞. Thus, the whole expression in (22) goes to 0.
Next, we show that limd→∞ g2(d) = 0. As d ≥ 2, we have that g2(d) > 0 for every d. Using
the first inequality of (20) with x = ln d2 and y = d, we have(
1 + ln d2d
)d
> exp
(
d ln d
ln d+ 2d
)
.
Thus, we obtain an upper bound on g2 by writing
√
d = exp
(
ln d
2
)
:
g2(d) <
2 exp
(
ln d
2
)
ln d exp
(
d ln d
ln d+2d
) = 2ln d exp
(
(ln d)2
2 ln d+ 4d
)
. (23)
As 4d is the dominating term in the denominator of the argument of the exponential function,
the argument goes to 0 for d→∞, and thus the r.h.s. of (23) goes to 0, showing the claim.
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